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WHEN TO HEAR THE HEARSAY: A
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE OF
EVIDENCE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
CRIMINALLY ACCUSED TO CONFRONT
THE WITNESSES AGAINST HER
SCOTT A. SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

Mary, a three-year-old girl, is sitting in Doctor McCracken's
office having a conversation about the man who has sexually
abused her. Mary hesitantly answers the questions from Dr.
McCracken about her own abuse, but she is also quick to answer
questions about the sexual abuse that has been suffered by her
five-year-old brother, Ted. Dr. McCracken knows the answers he
wants from Mary and asks her questions that suggest the answer.
There is no video or audio tape of the conversation. Subsequently,
a court determines that Mary is too young to be asked to testify
regarding the answers she gave Dr. McCracken. The State
prosecutor, Terrence Medrah, has arrested Neil for sexually
abusing these two children, and would like Dr. McCracken to
testify to Mary's statements. This testimony is very damaging to
Neil's case, and if Mary does not testify, Neil's lawyer will not have
the opportunity to ask her questions in front of the jury. If Mary's
testimony is allowed into evidence, it could violate Neil's Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness who gives testimony
against him. However, if the testimony is not allowed into
evidence, a sexual predator of children could be cruising the
playgrounds tomorrow.!
In order for a court to allow Dr.
* J.D. Candidate, January 2000. Law Clerk for the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Indiana, August 2000. The Author
would like to dedicate this Comment to Mildred Gehl, and to the loving
memory of her daughter and his mother, Katherine.
1. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding that the hearsay
statements of a two-and-one-half year old girl made to her doctor during an
examination did not exhibit indicia of reliability such that the statements
could be admitted against the accused). In Wright, the doctor asked the young
girl leading questions that suggested answers, which would implicate her
father, the defendant. Id. at 810. The statements of the girl were not recorded
1287
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McCracken to repeat Mary's statements, the statements must
meet certain standards. A portion of the current federal standard
requires that statements demonstrate "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."2
The concept of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness is
related, in a legal context, to the rules for admitting hearsay
statements into evidence during a criminal trial.! According to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is "a statement4 other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."5
Generally, hearsay will not be admitted into evidence during a
trial;6 however, certain statements that are hearsay can be
admitted if they qualify as a hearsay exception.! When a hearsay
statement is inculpatory against the defendant in a criminal trial
and the government wishes to introduce that statement into
evidence, the Sixth Amendment 9 must be satisfied. ° The Sixth
in any manner, and the court ruled that the girl was unavailable to testify
herself. Id. at 812. In the five to four decision, Justice O'Connor held that the
trial court erred by allowing the doctor to testify as to what the girl had told
him. Id. at 813.
2. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980) (stating particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness is one of the two methods for establishing the
appropriate level of reliability necessary for admission of inculpatory hearsay
statements against the defendant when the confrontation clause is in issue).
"There are few subjects ... upon which [the Supreme Court] and other courts
have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
3. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 57.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
statement is "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." Id.
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(C).
6. FED. R. EVID. 802. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Id.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (including hearsay exceptions when the
availability of the declarant is immaterial); FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing the
hearsay exceptions, which require that the declarant is unavailable to testify).
See generally John Corkery, Conflict with the Confrontation Clause,
'Gangbangers'Exception v. Cross-Examination,CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Mar. 6,
1997, at 6 (examining an Illinois hearsay exception designed to admit
inculpatory hearsay statements when the reason the declarant is unavailable
is his own refusal to testify). Dean Corkery writes that the Illinois exception,
designed to combat gang silence, does not comport with the Confrontation
Clause. Id.
8. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 908 (4th ed. 1968) defines inculpatory as
"[g]oing or tending to establish guilt; intended to establish guilt; criminative."

9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
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amendment, which includes the Confrontation Clause," gives the
defendant in a criminal case the
12 opportunity "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."
When the declarant of an inculpatory statement is not
available" to testify and the government plans to use this

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id. If a witness for the government in a murder case dies before a second trial,
it does not violate the confrontation clause to allow a 'transcribed copy of the
reporter's stenographic notes of his testimony" to be read into evidence against
the accused. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895). "The rule
that a witness must be cross-examined as to his contradictory statements
before they are given into evidence to impeach his credit is a rule of convenient
and orderly practice, and not a rule of the competency of evidence." Id. at 260.
10. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (stating that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth amendment cannot be read so narrowly as
to not include the exclusion of hearsay testimony). See also California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (explaining that "hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values").
11. U.S CONST. amend. VI. The right of confrontation has a "lineage that
traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1015 (1988). The importance of confrontation is that the witness is
under oath and the jury has an opportunity to observe the witness and
determine if they are credible. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986). The
right to confrontation and cross-examination is a fundamental right. Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)
(discussing the connection between the Confrontation Clause and crossexamination).
[Tlhe Clause envisions a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing
the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but also of
compelling the witness to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor whether his testimony
is worthy of belief.
Id.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining unavailability). "Unavailability as a
witness" includes situations in which the declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the
declarant's statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
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statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 4 the
statement is rank hearsay. In order for the government to use
such a statement against the accused, the statement must qualify
as a hearsay exception" and satisfy the Sixth Amendment
protections which belong to the accused. Once a court rules that
the statement is admissible as a hearsay exception, the admission
may be challenged on the grounds that it violates the Sixth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts6 outlined a standard
for testing the constitutionality of the admission of such
statements against the accused:
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the confrontation clause normally requires a showing that lie
is unavailable. Even then his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 7
To meet the current standard of admissibility, a statement
must demonstrate particularized guarantees of trustworthiness if
it does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' 8
"Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" is the
standard that must be interpreted by the judge in determining
admissibility of inculpatory hearsay statements when the
declarant is unavailable and the statement does not fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. 9 Part I of this Comment reviews
the creation of the standard. Part II discusses different ways in
which federal courts have implemented the standard, and Part III
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim

of lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

Id.
14. FED. R. EVID. 801(C).
15. FED. R. EVID. 802.
16. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 57.
17. Id. According to the Roberts Court, the integrity of the entire judicial
system is called into question when defendants are not given the opportunity
to properly confront witnesses. Id. at. 64.

18. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (holding that one of the hearsay
exceptions which is so firmly rooted in our judicial history as to not require
analysis is the co-conspirator exception).
19. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (noting that hearsay

evidence that does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception creates a
presumption of unreliability).

The presumption of unreliability can be

overcome, by a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. If
the presumption is overcome, the hearsay evidence will pass the constitutional
muster of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
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proposes a federal rule of evidence which reflects a concern for
preservation of the Sixth Amendment right of the accused in
criminal cases.
To understand the implementation of the
standard, it is important to understand the development of the
standard.
I.

CREATION OF THE STANDARD BY THE SUPREME COURT

In a criminal case, when the government seeks to introduce
uncross-examined testimony that is against the defendant's
interest into evidence, the defendant's Sixth Amendment
protection must be considered.
The current standard for
admission has taken many years to develop and has caused a
great deal of debate.
A. Californiav. Green
In 1970, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in California v.
Green" suggested an outline that was the inspiration for the
current standard for admitting hearsay evidence which conflicts
with the Confrontation Clause. 1 In Green, Melvin Porter, a
sixteen-year-old boy, was arrested for selling marijuana and
testified at the preliminary hearing of Green, who was alleged to
have supplied the drugs.22
In his testimony, Porter made
inculpatory statements that implicated Green as the supplier of
the marijuana."
During the preliminary hearing, Porter was
cross-examined by Green's attorney, the same attorney who
represented Green at trial.24 Two months later at Green's formal

20. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Justice Harlan suggested the
possibility of admitting hearsay statements against the defendant under
certain circumstances when the declarant was not present in the courtroom
for cross-examination. Id. at 186-87. Harlan's notion was unusual because
prior to his concurrence, cross-examination was considered synonymous with
the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. William S. Pittman,
Note, Barker v. Morris and the Right to Confrontation, 14 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 839, 849 (1987).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. Green, 399 U.S. at 151.
23. Id. Porter named Green four days after Porter had been arrested. Id.
He told a police officer named Wade that about a month prior to his arrest
Green had called him to see if he would sell some marijuana for him. Id.
Porter claimed that later that afternoon Green gave him a shopping bag
containing twenty-nine bags of marijuana. Id. Porter was arrested for selling
a portion of these drugs to an undercover narcotics officer. Id.
At the
preliminary hearing Porter again implicated Green, but instead of saying
Green personally delivered the drugs, Porter claims that Green told him
where to pick up the drugs. Id. At the hearing, Porter was subjected to a
rigorous cross-examination by Green's attorney. Id.
At the close of the
hearing, Green was charged with furnishing marijuana to a minor. Id.
24. Id.
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5
During his testimony,
trial, Porter was again called to testify."
Porter recanted his earlier inculpatory statements about Green,
claiming he was unable to remember the statements due to drug
his earlier statements into evidence in order
use. 6 The state read
7
to impeach Porter.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of the testimony
satisfied the Confrontation Clause. 8 The Court reasoned that the
statement was sufficiently reliable for admission because Porter
had been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing.
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, proposed a standard that
placed heavy emphasis on the prosecution's duty to produce
witnesses. ° In cases where a witness can not be produced, a
hearsay statement could only be admitted if there is a
determination that the statement is reliable.3 ' This emphasis on
the importance of a showing of unavailability would put pressure
on prosecutors to find witnesses so that they could be crossThe concept that hearsay
examined at the trial of the accused'
statements might be admitted when the defendant does not have
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness was put into practice

25. Id. Under the current Federal Rules of Evidence, which were enacted
after Green, these statements could be used by the prosecution to refresh the
recollection of the witness, if he came to court and claimed that the statements
could not be remembered. FED. R. EvID. 612.
26. Green, 399 U.S. at 152.
27. Id. Even though the statements would not qualify as hearsay under the
current federal rules, the statements present a Confrontation Clause problem.
Id. at 153. The Sixth Amendment offers an opportunity for a criminal
defendant to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. One
of the earliest opinions to allow pre-recorded testimony from a previous case
into evidence was Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
Mattox held that the reading of the transcribed reports of the defendant's
earlier testimony under oath, did not infringe on his Sixth Amendment rights.
Id. at 244.
28. Green, 399 U.S. at 170.
29. Id. at 165.
30. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The precise holding of the court today is that the Confrontation Clause
does not preclude the introduction of an out-of-court declaration, taken
under oath and subject to cross-examination, to prove the truth of the
matters asserted therein, when the declarant is available as a witness at
trial. With this I agree.
Id. at 172. Justice Harlan explained that he would have remanded the case to
determine the admissibility of statements made to the officer (Wade). Id. at
189. See supra note 23 for a discussion of Officer Wade.
31. Green, 399 U.S. at 187 (1970).
32. See id. at 186 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that he would require
states to conform to what he considered to be the true meaning of the
Confrontation Clause). According to Justice Harlan, the Confrontation Clause
would forbid the use of hearsay evidence when the declarant is unavailable.
Id.
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six months after the Green decision in Dutton v. Evans."
B. Dutton v. Evans
In Dutton, a co-conspirator of the defendant made a
statement to his cellmate implicating the defendant, who had been
charged with murder.34 When the co-conspirator refused to testify,
the prosecutor called the cellmate, who was one of twenty
witnesses against the defendant. 5 The defendant objected to this
cellmate's hearsay statement which was admitted under the
Georgia co-conspirator hearsay exception. 6 The objection was
overruled, and the Supreme Court upheld the ruling."
The
defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine the cellmate,
but the co-conspirator had not been cross-examined as to the
statement.3 8
In coming to its decision, the Supreme Court outlined four
factors to take into account when determining the reliability of a
statement against the defendant when cross-examination is not

33. See 400 U.S. 74, 74 (1970) (holding that a Georgia co-conspirator
hearsay exception is not automatically invalid because it goes farther than the
federal rules in terms of the kinds of hearsay it allows). The court also held
that the admission of the statements made in the case did not deny the
defendant his Confrontation Clause rights because the statements, although
not cross-examined, were sufficiently trustworthy for the jury to hear. Id. at
75.
34. Id. at 77. In April 1964, the brutally beaten bodies of three police
officers were found handcuffed together in the pine forests of Gwinnet County,
Georgia. Id. at 76. Each of the officers died as the result of multiple gunshot
wounds delivered in the back of the head. Id. After a long investigation,
police arrested four men including the defendant, Evans. Id. An alleged
accomplice of the defendant (Williams), after returning from his own
arraignment hearing, made a statement to a fellow prisoner named Shaw. Id.
He told Shaw that if it had not been for the defendant, "we wouldn't be in this
now." Id. At the trial of the defendant, the prosecution called Shaw to repeat
the statement of Williams. Id. The Georgia court admitted the statement
under a Georgia co-conspirator hearsay exception, which allows the admission
of statements made by co-conspirators when they are in the process of
concealing the conspiracy. Id. at 78. But see FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(2)(E)
(providing for admission into evidence of only co-conspirator statements made
in furtherance of the conspiracy). "A statement is not hearsay if-[t]he
statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
Id.
35. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77. The prosecution offered 19 witnesses other than
Shaw, and the defendant counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine
each of the witnesses. Id. One of the other witnesses gave an eyewitness
account of the murder. Id. at 87.
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954). "After the fact of conspiracy shall be
proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of
the criminal project shall be admissible against all." Id.
37. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77-78.
38. Id.
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possible. 9 These factors include: (1) does the statement contain an
assertion of a past fact?;41 (2) was the declarant speaking from
personal knowledge?; 41 (3) what is the likelihood that the assertion
was based on faulty recollection?; 42 and (4) did the circumstances
3
under which the statements were made indicate reliability.?
In Dutton, the Court tied Confrontation Clause analysis to
hearsay exceptions in its discussion of the co-conspirator
exception. Justice Harlan, in his Dutton concurrence, rejected a
tie between hearsay exceptions and Confrontation Clause analysis
noting that the Constitution was not written to establish laws of
evidence. Justice Harlan felt that hearsay analysis should be used
to determine if evidence is admissible and that the Confrontation
Clause analysis is reserved to protect defendants when those
statements are ruled admissible.45 Using Justice Harlan's analysis
39. Id. at 87-89.
40. See id. (holding that the statement by Williams and repeated by Shaw
was not "an express assertion of a past fact"). The court also concluded that
the statement carried its own warning to the jury so that it would not be given
an undue weight as to its truth. Id.
41. See id. (stating that because Williams had personal knowledge of the
crime, cross-examination of him would not possibly be able to show the
statement to be false). Since Williams was clearly in a position to know that
the defendant was part of the murder, the court ruled that cross-examination
would be of little value. Id. at 87-89.
42. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87-89 (ruling that the possibility of Williams'
statement being made as a result of a bad memory was so remote that this
lended some reliability to the statement).
43. Id. The court found that the circumstances which lead to Williams'
statement went toward establishing reliability. Id. This was because
Williams' statements to his cell mate were spontaneous and, at the time, were
against his penal interest to make. Id.
44. Id. at 78.
45. Id. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring). After Green, Judge Harlan rethought
his stance of determining if evidence met Confrontation Clause requirements
based on the production of witnesses at trial. Id. By the time Dutton was
decided, Harlan thought that hearsay analysis should not be governed or
intermingled with Confrontation Clause analysis. Id. Quoting Wigmore, 5 J
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940), J. Harlan wrote:
[t]he Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial
statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infrajudicially,-this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being,-but
only what mode of procedure should be followed-i.e. a cross-examining
procedure-in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary
law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially.
Id. Justice Harlan conceded that the shift from Confrontation Clause analysis
was natural, but wrote, "however natural the shift may be, once made it
carries the seeds of great mischief for enlightened development in the law of
evidence." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 95 (Harlan, J., concurring). By Dutton, Justice
Harlan was no longer satisfied with his own opinion in Green. See supra note
32 for a discussion of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Green. In Dutton,
Justice Harlan explained that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was
not to create preferential treatment toward defendants by requiring the
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from Dutton and Green, along with various other historical
references, the Supreme Court outlined the current standard of
admissibility in Ohio v. Roberts.

C. Ohio v.Roberts
In 1980, the Supreme Court established the current federal
standard with the help of the earlier decisions and a historical look
at the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts.46 Roberts was
accused, among other things, of forging checks from the account of
Bernard Isaacs. Roberts' attorney called Isaacs' daughter at the
preliminary hearing, and she admitted to letting Roberts into her
apartment but denied giving him her father's checks." Roberts'
attorney did not ask the judge if the girl could be treated as a
hostile witness and did not attempt to cross-examine the girl about
this denial. 8 When the daughter, who was subpoenaed five times,
failed to appear at the trial, Roberts claimed she had given him
permission to use the checks, and the prosecution was allowed to
read the girl's earlier testimony into evidence. 9
prosecution to produce witnesses, but rather to ensure a degree of fairness.
Id. at 95.
46. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1979).
47. Id. at 58. On January 7, 1975, Herschel Roberts was arrested and
charged with forging a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and for possession
of a credit card also belonging to Mr. Isaac. Id. He was arrested in Lake
County, Ohio, and his preliminary hearing was scheduled for three days later
on January 10th. Id. The prosecution called several witnesses at the
preliminary hearing, including Mr. Isaacs. Id. at 59. Roberts' appointed
counsel had seen Anita Isaacs, Bernard's daughter, in the courtroom hallway
and called her as the only witness for the defense at the preliminary hearing.
Id. at 60. During the hearing Anita confessed that she had allowed Herschel
Roberts to use her apartment while she was away. Id. Roberts' counsel asked
Anita if she had given Roberts permission to use the checks and credit card, as
this was Roberts' story. Id. Anita denied giving Roberts permission. Id.
Roberts' counsel did not ask the court if he could treat the witness as hostile
and cross-examine her and the prosecution asked the girl no questions. Id. at
58.
48. Id. After the preliminary hearing, Roberts' counsel became a municipal
court judge, and a new defender was appointed to represent him. Id. at 59.
Anita was subpoenaed five times between November 1975 and March 1976,
but she did not appear at trial. Id.
49. Id. at 59. Roberts' jury trial began in March of 1976. Id. When Roberts
took the stand in his own defense, he claimed that Anita Isaacs had given him
the checkbook and credit cards of her parents with the understanding that he
had the right to use them. Id. In order to rebut this, the prosecution admitted
Anita's testimony from the preliminary hearing. Id. In order to admit the
testimony, the prosecution in Roberts relied on 01O REv. CODE ANN. §
2945.49 (1975), which states:
[t]estimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which
the defendant is present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by
deposition at the instance of the defendant or state, may be used
whenever the witness giving such testimony, dies, or cannot for any
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In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
admission of the hearsay statement against the defendant."
According to the Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause
"operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible
hearsay."5' In order to keep with the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution, the Court ruled that it is first necessary for the
prosecution to produce the witness.52 If it can be demonstrated
that the defendant is unavailable, 5 only hearsay "marked with
such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the
To be this
reason of the general rule" can be admitted.54
trustworthy, a statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability,
The first is if the
which can be established in two ways."
reason be produced at the trial, or whenever the witness has, since
giving such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If such former
testimony is contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated
transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by the bill of exceptions
or transcript otherwise by testimony.
Id. at 59. See also FED. R. EVID. 804 (b)(1) (allowing the admission of certain
hearsay statements which were recorded during some other proceeding).
Former testimony is:
[tiestimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding,
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and a similar motive to
develop the testimony through direct, cross, or redirect testimony.
Id.
50. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56-57.
51. Id. at 65.
52. See id. (noting that, according to the Framers' intent, the best way to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause is face-to-face confrontation of a witness).
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to state that in every case the prosecution is
under an obligation to produce the declarant or demonstrate the unavailability
of the declarant. Id.
53. See supra note 13 for a definition of unavailability.
54. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
55. Id. at 66. See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (finding a hearsay
statement to lack reliability). In Lee, an Illinois court convicted the defendant
of murder. Id. at 538. Lee was arrested after confessing to the murder of a
person in her apartment building. Id. She confessed that she and her
boyfriend had worked together on the plan for the murder and later signed a
confession implicating both her and her boyfriend. Id. When Lee's boyfriend
later arrived at the police station, he was confronted by her. Id. The police
gave the two an opportunity to hug and an officer prompted Lee to explain
that she had already told the police everything. Id. Lee explained that they
were caught and reminded her boyfriend of their agreement not to let the
other take the blame for the murder. Id. at 533-34. The boyfriend also signed
a confession. Id. At trial, the State of Illinois attempted to use the confession
of her boyfriend against Lee. Id. The trial court permitted the confession into
evidence and the decision was affirmed on appeal. Id. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, found that the statement lacked the indicia of reliability
necessary for admission. Id. at 530. This is because the confession was given
after Lee implicated the boyfriend, so the Court ruled it to be presumptively
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statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," 6 and
the second is if the circumstances surrounding the statement show
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.57
According to
Roberts, if one of these two criteria is met, a hearsay statement
can be admitted against the defendant. This, of course, requires
first that the declarant is not available to be cross-examined at the
defendant's trial.
Today, the Roberts standard is the prevailing standard for
admission of these kinds of statements. The question addressed in
this Comment is whether this standard is sufficient to protect the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. To help form an opinion,
it is important to look at how the standard has been used and
interpreted since 1980.
II.

INTERPRETATION OF THE STANDARD

The application of the particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness concept that was articulated in Roberts left room
for a great deal of interpretation. When discussing the legal
interpretation of the Roberts standard, it is helpful to look at cases
that have implemented it. The standard arises most often in cases
involving the sexual abuse of children and cases involving criminal
co-defendants. To completely understand the problem with the
current standard, it is also helpful to review cases with uncommon
outcomes.
A. Idaho v. Wright
Ten years after the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court
decided Idaho v. Wright," one of the most important cases that
interpreted and modified the standard. In Wright, the Court
announced that the proper analysis to determine whether a
statement
demonstrated
particularized
guarantees
of

unreliable. Id. at 536.
56. Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348 (1992),
the defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault, residential burglary,
and home invasion. The four-year-old girl, whom the defendant was convicted
of assaulting, made statements to her mother and police before the trial. Id.

The girl, S.G., told her mother that the defendant had "put his mouth on her
front part," and S.G. told a police officer the defendant "used his tongue on her
in her private parts." Id. At trial, S.G. was unable to appear in court because
it was too difficult for her. Id. The trial judge admitted her earlier statements
into evidence under an Illinois hearsay exception known as a spontaneous
declaration. Id. at 352. The court ruled that this was not "a firmly rooted
hearsay exception." Id. at 350. The Illinois exception defines a spontaneous
declaration as "a statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition." Id.
57. White, 502 U.S. at 350.
58. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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trustworthiness was to look at the totality of the circumstances
that surrounded the making of the statement.59 The Court also
explained that it is improper for a judge to consider other evidence
that corroborates the statement when determining reliability.0
According to the Court, the use of corroborating evidence to show
reliability was the equivalent of "bootstrapping" the statement into
evidence based on the reliability of other incriminating evidence.6 '
According to Wright, this practice does not provide the defendant
2
the protection that the Confrontation Clause intended.
Wright, a case involving sexual abuse, did not offer a
comprehensive list of the factors needed to establish particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. The Court did list some factors
that could be considered by the trial judge when determining the
admissibility of statements made by the child victim in a sexual
abuse case." The Court stated that some factors to examine when
determining the reliability of these statements are the "mental
state of the declarant," "the motive to fabricate," "the use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age" and "the
spontaneity and consistent repetition" of the statement. 4
The question of what amounts to particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness arises in all types of criminal cases. These cases
frequently involve sexual assault against children. In order to
understand the way federal courts have interpreted the standard,
it is important to examine particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness as it applies to child sexual abuse cases.
B. Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Two years after Wright, the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity
to hear United States v. George.5 In George, the defendant
appealed from a conviction of sexual abuse of his twelve-year-old
daughter.66 At trial, the girl's doctor testified as to statements
59. Id. at 820. See supra note 1 for a discussion of the facts in the case.

60. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. In order to be admitted, hearsay evidence
must have its own indicia of reliability, its own "inherent trustworthiness."
Id. This reliability cannot be established by reference to other evidence in the
trial. Id.
61. Id. at 823. According to the Court, admission of these kinds of
statements based on corroborating circumstances is at odds with the

Confrontation Clause. Id. To be admitted under the Confrontation Clause,
inculpatory hearsay evidence must be deemed so reliable that cross
examination of the statement would only be of "marginal utility." Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 826.
64. Id. The Court noted that this list was not exclusive and was not meant
to be exclusive. Id. at 822. Specifically, the Court stated it was not endorsing
a "mechanical test" for determining what amounted to particularized

guarantees. Id.
65. United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97 (1992).
66. Id. at 98.
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made by the girl relating to the dates the abuse had occurred. 7
When the girl told the doctor about the abuse, she made reference
to specific months and days on which she was sexually abused."
George argued that admission of the statements violated his
Confrontation Clause rights because he was never given a chance
to cross-examine the girl about the statements and she was ruled
to be unavailable to testify.69
The George court ruled that although the statements did not
fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, they did demonstrate
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."0 The court held
that the statements were sufficiently reliable because the victim
had no motive to lie, she referred to the dates of her abuse by days
of the week "as would be expected from a child her age" and the
evidence did not show that the investigator used leading questions
when interviewing the girl.7
The following year, the Eighth Circuit interpreted one of the
Wright factors contrary to the way the George court did. In Ring v
Erickson,72 the statements of a twelve-year-old girl to her social
worker regarding sexual abuse were ruled unreliable under the

67. Id. at 99. Dr. Ortiz-Pino, who had examined the girl approximately five

months after the last attack, testified as to statements the girl had made to
him. Id. at 98-99.
68. Id. at 98. The girl described the sexual acts to the doctor and was able
to recall the approximate date of the third incident, but she did not remember
the dates of the first two counts of sexual abuse. Id.
69. Id. at 99.
70. George, 960 F.2d at 100. Cf. United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1297
(1993) (vacating the conviction of a mother convicted of assaulting her
daughter with a deadly weapon). The Barret court held that the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights were violated. Id. The defendant's three-year-old
daughter told others that her mother had burned her with cigarettes. Id. at
1298. The judge ruled that the daughter was not fit to testify, but her
statements were repeated at the mother's trial. Id. The girl could not explain
the difference between the truth and a lie during her preliminary hearing, and
the mother was not given the opportunity to present those statements to show
that the daughter was not credible. Id. The appellate court ruled that the
trial court erred in not allowing the mother to attack the reliability of the girl's
statement through a demonstration that the girl was an incompetent witness.

Id.
71. George, 960 F.2d at 100. In considering the motive to fabricate, the
court noted that the girl did not have a motive to lie about the dates of the
attacks. Id. It is worth mentioning that the court did not focus on the girl's
motive to lie about the sexual abuse happening, but rather her motive to lie
about the dates of the attacks.
72. 983 F.2d 818 (1993). Ring was convicted on four counts of second
degree criminal sexual conduct in the state court of Minnesota. Id. at 819,

The conduct involved two of the defendant's nieces, and at the time of the
appeal, the defendant had already served 54 months of his sentence. Id.
Ring's appeal sought to challenge the admission of two videotaped statements
of one of his nieces. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

1300

[32:1287

particularized guarantees standard. 7' The Ring court stated the
fact that a child uses words typical of children her age favors
unreliability, instead of the reliability attributed by the George
74

court.

In Webb v. Lewis,"5 the Ninth Circuit found that the
videotaped interview of a child who was alleged to have been
sexually abused failed to demonstrate particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 76 After quoting the four factors used to decide the
Wright case, the court proceeded to consider two other factors.77
The Webb court focused its reliability inquiry on the child's
reputation for telling the truth and whether the child tended to
fantasize.78
Another factor which courts have considered when testing the
reliability of child statements is whether the person who

73. Id. at 821. The trial court admitted the videotaped statements made to
the social worker under a special Minnesota hearsay exception for sexually
abused children. Id.
74. Id.
75. 44 F.3d 1387 (1994). See also Larson v. Nutt, 34 F.3d 647, 648 (1994)
(holding that the admission of a three-year-old child's inculpatory statement
did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). In
Larson, the defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct and files a
petition for habeas corpus. Id. The defendant argued that the inculpatory
statements of the child victim were inadmissible because there was not a
showing that the declarant was unavailable. Id. The girl was available, but
did not testify. Id. The court explained that the availability of the declarant
was no longer relevant after White v. Illinois. Id. According to White, for the
purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, the availability of the declarant is
only important when the out of court statements were made during an earlier
judicial hearing. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992). The Court
explained that the burden of showing that the declarant was unavailable in
most cases would put an unnecessary burden on the prosecution. Id. at 355.
By reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court made it clear that they
intended to limit the Roberts decision by limiting the circumstances in which
the unavailability requirement applied. Id. at 353.
76. Webb, 44 F.3d at 1393. In Webb, a two and one-half year old girl made
inculpatory videotaped statements to a social worker about the defendant,
Terry Webb. Id. at 1389. Prior to her statements to a Children Protective
Service social worker, the girl's baby-sitter told her, "Heather, you know what
Terry did to you was very very bad, and that Heavenly Father and Jesus does
not like bad things to happen to his little children, and He has given us special
friends to help us." Id. The same day of the interview while the baby-sitter
was telling the girl's mother about the abuse, the girl approached the babysitter and said, "Terry no do those things to me, Connie." Id.
77. Id. at 1391.
78. Id. at 1392. When considering the girl's reputation for telling the truth
on direct examination, the girl's mother stated that the girl always told the
truth. Id. On cross-examination, the mother did admit that the girl was not
always truthful in the way she conducted herself. Id. The girl also told of a
time when her mother had intercourse with Terry (the defendant). Id. The
mother denied any sexual relation, and the court concluded that either the
mother had lied or that the girl did have a tendency to fantasize. Id.
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interviewed the child asked leading questions. In Hutchcraft v.
Roberts,79 the statements of a sixteen-year-old mentally retarded
girl were ruled not to demonstrate particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 80 During the girl's interview, her sister told the
interviewer to ask the disabled girl about certain instances."
Apart from sexual abuse cases, the particularized guarantees
standard of reliability arises often in cases involving co-defendant
statements in which the co-defendant makes an inculpatory
statement about the defendant and is then unavailable to testify.82
To fully understand the range of court opinions in this area, it is
important to examine some of these cases.
C. The Co-defendant Cases
In Lee v. Illinois,83 the Supreme Court held that evidence
falling within the residual hearsay exception creates a
presumption of unreliability. 4 This presumption can only be
overcome by a showing of particularized guarantees of
The government was able to overcome this
trustworthiness.'
presumption in United States v. Deeb.8" In Deeb, the government
introduced the inculpatory former testimony of a co-defendant.87
79. Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846 (1992).
80. Id. at 851. Prior to giving testimony, the girl stated that she did not
know what the truth was, nor what it meant to tell a lie. Id. at 847.
81. Id. at 850. On at least two occasions, during her interviews, the girl's
sister was with her and instructed the investigator to ask her questions about
certain instances. Id.
82. See supra note 13 for the federal rule defining unavailability of a
declarant.
83. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
84. Id. at 543. In Lee, the Illinois court convicted the defendant of
murdering two people, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 530.
At trial, the confession of a co-defendant was used against the defendant. Id.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the confession did not
possess the reliability needed for admissibility, neither because of
corroborating evidence nor because of the fact that the confession was
interlocking. Id.
85. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
86. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532 (1994). In United States v. GomezLemos, 939 F.2d 326, 329 (1991), the district court admitted the inculpatory
grand jury testimony of a co-defendant. In Gomez-Lemos, the declarant,
Orsorio, told the grand jury that he had met the defendant in Miami Beach
and that the defendant later offered him money to drive a van from
Washington, D.C. to Detroit. Id.
87. Deeb, 13 F.3d at 1534. In Deeb, defendant Deeb and one of his codefendants, Biamby, were indicted by the grand jury for charges involving the
importation of cocaine. Id. at 1533. Biamby made an agreement with the
government to cooperate and testify against Deeb and the others who were
charged. Id. When the day of the trial arrived, Deeb did not come to court.
Id. at 1534. Two years later, Deeb was arrested in the Dominican Republic
and brought to the United States to stand trial. Id. By this time, Biamby was
very sick with AIDS and had a great deal of memory loss so he was
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The Deeb court assumed that the former testimony exception did
not apply to the statement and analyzed its reliability under the
residual hearsay exception. 8
According to the Deeb court,
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness were demonstrated
by the facts that the testimony was given under oath, the
statements were self-inculpatory to the co-defendant and were
subject
to the cross-examination of other co-defendants in the
89
case.

The government was unable to overcome the presumption of
0
unreliability in Miller v. Miller."
In Miller, the confession of a counavailable to testify against Deeb. Id. At Deeb's trial, the testimony of
Biamby made two years earlier was admitted against Deeb. Id.
88. Id. at 1538. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b)(5), which was relied upon
by the Deeb court and which was later amended in 1997, defines statements
not excluded by the hearsay rule:
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can produce
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
89. Deeb, 13 F.3d at 1538. See also United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249,
1254-55 (1995) (upholding a trial court decision to admit inculpatory hearsay
testimony into evidence against a drug crime defendant). In Shaw, vaious
defendants were tried and convicted for federal drug crimes. Id. at 1251.
While Shaw himself was still a fugitive, one of the government witnesses
against him died. Id. at 1252. Prior to the witness' death, the witness had
testified at the trials of other defendants in the case. Id. The testimony
implicated Shaw and the government introduced a transcript of that
testimony into evidence against him. Id. The appellate court upheld the
admission of the transcript for several reasons. Id. at 1254. The court relied
on the fact that the decedent's testimony "involved the same transactions as
those involved in the Shaw trial" and also that the decedent's statements had
been cross-examined by a lawyer representing another defendant. Id. Since
the other defendant had a similar interest to Shaw, the court found the
transcript sufficiently reliable. Id. A final reason the Shaw court cited in
determining reliability was the fact that the deceased woman's testimony was
consistent on both direct and cross-examination. Id.
90. 784 F. Supp. 390 (1992). See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 126 (1968) (holding that instructing a jury not to apply the confession of a
co-defendant to both defendants in a criminal trial violates the Confrontation
Clause). In Bruton, two defendants were jointly tried for armed robbery. Id.
at 124. At trial, the government introduced a confession made by one of the
co-defendants implicating the other. Id. at 127. The confessing co-defendant
was unavailable because he refused to testify, and the court instructed the
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defendant, which implicated the defendant, was introduced
against the defendant in a trial for murder. 91 When the codefendant was asked why he implicated the defendant, he
explained that he was "not going to take the fall alone."' The
court ruled that the confession did not demonstrate particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness because it was made while the
defendant was in police custody, and according to the confessor, he
had a motive to implicate others in the murder. 9
In 1993, the Fifth Circuit took a different approach to
determining the reliability of a co-defendant's statement. In
United States v. Flores,94 the Court ruled that inculpatory grand
jury testimony of a co-defendant was especially unreliable because
the declarant was unavailable. 9 The Federal Rules of Evidence
list five different situations in which a declarant is considered
unavailable for hearsay purposes.96
Under Roberts, the
prosecution must establish the unavailability of the declarant
before admission of an inculpatory hearsay statement can be
considered.97 According to the Flores court, the very fact that the
co-defendant was unavailable because of his invocation of Fifth
Amendment protection made the statements less reliable. 9
jury to disregard the confession as to the non-confessing defendant. Id. at 125.
The Supreme Court held that the statement should not have been admitted
because it was not cross-examined and added substantial weight to the case of
the government. Id. at 127-28.
91. Miller, 784 F. Supp. at 393. In Miller, the defendant was convicted of
murder, assault, kidnapping and use of a firearm. Id. at 390. While the
defendant and Jordan, a co-defendant, were under arrest and had received
their Miranda warnings, they both made confessions which implicated the
other in the crime. Id. at 392-93. Neither of the defendants testified at trial,
and the state introduced the confessions as substantive evidence against all of
the defendants. Id. at 393. The trial court admitted the evidence under a
Michigan rule of evidence that allows hearsay when the statement was
against the declarant's interest at the time it was made. Id. On petition for
habeas corpus, the court held that the statement was not properly admitted as
a declaration against interest because the portions of the confession that
implicated the defendant were not against Jordan's interest. Id. at 395.
92. Id. at 393.
93. Id. at 396.
94. United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (1993).
95. Id. at 777. The court explained that statements against interest should
not be admissible when the declarant is unavailable to testify because of his
invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 780. According to the Flores court,
these types of statements are inherently unreliable for two reasons. Id. The
first reason is that the statement is accusatory in nature. Id. The second
reason is that the statement is given to plain clothes law enforcement officials
after the declarant has been arrested Id. Because of the conditions under
which the statement is made, there is always the possibility that the declarant
is trying to shift the blame. Id.
96. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
97. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 56 (1980).
98. Flores, 985 F.2d at 780. The Fifth Amendment states that "no person
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Although discussions as to what amounts to particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness happen often in sexual abuse and
co-defendant cases, the issue arises in all types of situations. A
discussion of some of the more unusual cases will clarify the
conflict between the interests of prosecutors and the Confrontation
Clause.
D. The Fringe Cases
In United States v. Clarke,99 the defendant was indicted for

possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine
and conspiracy to do the same.' ° The defendant's brother was also
indicted and made a statement at his own suppression hearing
that implicated the defendant in the crime."' The United States
introduced this testimony at the trial of the defendant. 2 The trial
court admitted the evidence against the defendant and found that
it was sufficiently reliable."' In coming to this conclusion, the
court stated that the suppression hearing testimony was
admissible because the brother "had no motive to lie at the hearing
or to implicate his brother for any ulterior purpose."" 4
Unfortunately, this type of analysis does almost nothing to test the
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81 (1993). See generally Manocchio v.
Morgan, 919 F.2d 770, 784 (1989) (holding that admission of an autopsy report
to show the victim's cause of death was admissible even though the medical
examiner who prepared the report was not at trial). In Manocchio, the
reliability of the autopsy report was established by the facts that the report
was prepared by a qualified physician and the physician had no reason to lie.
Id. at 777.
100. Clarke, 2 F.3d at 81. In Clarke, Michael Clarke, the brother of the
defendant, was indicted for intent to distribute crack cocaine. Id. at 83. The
cocaine was found in a toolbox, and Michael testified at his grand jury hearing
that he had told Christopher, the defendant, to buy the toolbox prior to the
crime. Id. Christopher was indicted for conspiracy in the crime for his alleged
involvement in purchasing the toolbox. Id. Michael refused to testify against
his brother, and the district court ruled that he was unavailable. Id. It was at
this point when the court admitted the uncross-examined grand jury
testimony of the defendant's brother into evidence against him. Id.
101. Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83.
102. Id. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 579 (1998)
(holding that trial court erred in admitting an anonymous note that implicated

the defendant in a robbery).

In Mitchell, the defendant was convicted of

robbing an armored car. Id. at 575. After the robbery, police found a getaway
car that contained a note with the license plate number of the car in which the
defendant had been apprehended. Id. On appeal, the court ruled that the
note was improperly admitted into evidence, but that its admission was
harmless error. Id. at 579. In Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 142 (1995), the
Fifth Circuit upheld the admission of an inculpatory laboratory report when
the preparer of the report was not cross-examined.
103. Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83.
104. Id.
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actual reliability of the statement. To allow an uncross-examined
inculpatory statement to be admitted against the defendant
simply because the declarant had no reason to lie makes a
mockery of the Confrontation Clause.
0
In United States v. Canan,'
' the Sixth Circuit took a different

approach to establishing reliability. During discovery, a witness
who was dying of cancer made a videotaped statement under
oath. °6 The witness was aware that he would not live very long,
and his statements were incriminating to the defendant.' 7 In an
unusual approach, the admission of the statement was upheld.
The court found that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
were established by the facts that the statement was made with
the defendant present, the declarant knew he would be dead soon,
the declarant had no reason to expect he would not be crossexamined at trial and the statement was consistent with
testimony in another case."0 By considering the consistency of the
statement with testimony in other cases, the Canan court directly
contradicted the Wright rule, which does not allow corroborating
circumstances to be considered. 9
Courts currently have a great deal of discretion in deciding
what factors to apply when testing the reliability of inculpatory
hearsay statements. Unfortunately, the phrase "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" is so vague that it allows a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to be defined differently by
courts.
In order to preserve the Sixth Amendment right of
Confrontation, it is necessary to establish a more consistent
framework in which inculpatory hearsay statements will be
considered. The current Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain
a rule that establishes a standard for measuring particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. Given that Confrontation Clause
protection must be afforded to all criminal defendants in State and
Federal cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence would be a good place

105. United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954 (1995).
106. Id. at 964. In Canan, the defendant was charged with six counts of
various crimes centered on drugs. Id. at 958. In the years prior to his arrest,
Canan was involved in the drug business with several people, including

Kimbler. Id. at 957. During a police investigation, a videotaped statement
was made of Kimbler which included highly inculpatory statements about

Canan. Id. at 958. The statements were made under oath and Canan was
present without his attorney. Id.
107. Id. at 958. The trial court went on to say that the reliability of the
testimony was bolstered by the fact that the declarant knew he was being
taped, he had firsthand knowledge of the fact and he agreed to be truthful. Id.
108. Id. at 964, 965.
109. Cf Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990) (holding that relying on
corroborating evidence to bolster the reliability of an inculpatory hearsay
statement is improper).
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to implement and test a more constitutionally friendly standard.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE
Federal Rule of Evidence 807 is the residual hearsay
exception.11 ° It allows the admission of hearsay evidence to be
admitted against the defendant if the hearsay statement is not
covered by a specific hearsay exception and demonstrates
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.""' Rule
807 also requires that the statement be "offered to prove a
material fact," the statement must have more probative value"'
than any other evidence offered to prove that fact and that
admission must meet the purpose of the rules and serve the
interests of justice."'
Although Rule 807's language appears to protect the Sixth
Amendment rights of the accused, it does not offer any guidance to
the judge in testing a statement's reliability."' The Federal Rules
of Evidence also lack guidelines for limiting the lengths a judge
can go to find a statement reliable. Since there are no guidelines,
too much discretion is in the hands of judges to find an uncrossexamined statement reliable enough to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment.
In order to protect the accused in a criminal case from
unreliable and uncross-examined inculpatory evidence, Congress
should amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to include a rule
designed to exclude such evidence.

110. FED. R. EVID. 807. Rule 807 was added to the rules in 1997 and
represents the union of two now-defunct rules. Id.
111. FED. R. EVID. 807.
112. FED. R. EVID. 807(A) and FED. R. EVID. 807(B).
113. FED. R. EVID. 807(C).
114. Rule 807 explains that the statement must demonstrate "equivalent

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," but it does not offer any
guidance for determining what circumstances establish the guarantees. FED.

R. EVID. 807. The rule states:
[a] statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded
by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is

offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the

general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in

advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
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PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 802.5

RULE 802.5-INCULPATORY HEARSAY STATEMENTS; ADMISSIBILITY
IN CRIMINAL CASES

(a) Generalprovision.
Inculpatory hearsay statement(s) are not admissible against
the accused in a criminal case, if the declarant is
unavailable..5 to testify, unless (A) the prosecution
demonstrates the unavailability of the declarant, and (B) the
statement(s) fall(s) within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
or (C) the statement(s) demonstrate(s) particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, by reviewing the facts
surrounding the making of the statement(s)." 6
(b) Definitions.
(1) An "inculpatory hearsay statement" is any part of a
hearsay statement, as defined by Rule 801,"7 which is made
by someone other than the defendant and goes to establish
the guilt of the defendant as to any element of the crime
accused of.
(2) A declarant is "unavailable" if (A) exempted by ruling of
the court on grounds of privilege,"8 or (B) persists in refusing
to testify despite a court order to do so," or (C) testifies to
lack of memory as to the statement,2 or (D) is absent from
the hearing and the prosecution has been unable to procure
the declarant's attendance. 2' A declarant is not unavailable
as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability to testify, 12or absence is due to wrongdoing on the
part of the accused.
(3) The "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" shall include Rule
804(b)(1), 123 Rule 804(b)(2),"2 Rule 803(6)," Rule 803(8),126 and
115. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (explaining the position Congress has taken as
to what constitutes unavailability for hearsay purposes).
116. See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990) (holding that
the circumstances which surround the making of the statement should be
reviewed, but evidence which corroborates the making of the statement should
not be considered when measuring reliability).
117. FED. R. EVID. 801. Federal Rule 801(c) states, "hearsay is a statement
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.

R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
R. EVID. 804(b)(1).

Rule 804(b)(1) is the former testimony
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any other hearsay exception that Congress decides to be
firmly rooted.
(4) A statement can only demonstrate "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" if (A) the statement is so
reliable that cross-examination of the declarant would be of
no utility,'27 and (B) the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement suggest the declarant was being
truthful in her statement, and (C) the judge makes a
determination under Rule 104128 that the witness who will
repeat the proffered statement lacks any motive to lie.
(5) The facts "surrounding the making of the statement" are
those facts that might effect the reliability of the statement
at the time it was made. These facts shall not include
evidence that corroborates the truth of the statement, such as
other evidence, which inculpates the accused. 2 9
CONCLUSION

Under the current federal standard by which inculpatory
hearsay statements are admitted against the accused in criminal
cases, the judge has too much discretion. Since "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" is such an amorphous term, each
judge has the ability to find a statement reliable without much
guidance. This is detrimental to the accused. If a judge finds that
the presumptively unreliable hearsay statement is admissible, the
accused could be convicted of a crime based on uncross-examined
testimony. Without a narrower understanding of what rises to the
level of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a criminal
defendant could be stripped of Confrontation Clause protections." °
exception to the federal rules. Id.
124. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66n.8 (1980). Rule 804(b)(2) is the dying
declaration exception to hearsay and allows admission of statements made by
the declarant when the declarant made those statements believing she would
soon be dead. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
125. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Rule 803(6) is the business records exception to

the federal rules. Id.
126. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Rule 803(8) allows the admission of public
records into evidence. Id.
127. Cf Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (holding that statement
must be so reliable that cross-examination by the defendant would only be of

'marginal utility").
128. FED. R. EVID. 104. Rule 104 is the rule of evidence that guides a judge
in ruling on preliminary questions of admissibility. Id. When making a Rule

104 determination, a judge is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence,
except rules of privilege. Id.
129. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 (forbidding the use of corroborating
evidence to be used to bolster the reliability of hearsay evidence).
130. See generally FED. R. EVID. 807 (Committee Note 2) (citing Myrna S.
Raeder's concern during committee hearings for the unclear standards used to
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This proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence
would act to help define a more appropriate measure for assessing
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. An amendment like
the one proposed would act to reduce the amount of uncrossexamined statements admitted into evidence and would be a
positive step toward upholding constitutional protections.
A standard should be developed that will allow uncrossexamined and inculpatory hearsay statements to be admitted
against the defendant only when those statements are truly
reliable. Once such a standard is implemented, the Confrontation
Clause will be satisfied.

determine trustworthiness). Professor Raeder also expressed concern that
Rule 807 will allow prosecutors too much freedom to introduce inculpatory
hearsay and that this will endanger the Confrontation Clause rights of the
accused. Id. Writing for ten professors of evidence, she suggests that the
residual hearsay rule be tightened to avoid prosecutorial overuse. Id.

